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 International climate negotiations are currently oriented towards preparing a new grand deal on mitigation of cli-
mate change. Intent on preventing global temperatures 
from rising more than 2°C, industrialized and developing 
countries aim to conclude this deal at the 2015 United Na-
tions Climate Conference in Paris, France. The crucial ele-
ment of the agreement is international climate finance. In-
dustrialized countries have pledged to mobilize 
USD 100bn annually from 2020 onwards. In this frame-
work, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as the UNFCCC’s 
primary financial mechanism shall allo-
cate a significant public budget to devel-
oping countries for climate change miti-
gation and adaptation.
India and other developing coun-
tries insist that there will be no new 
agreement if industrial countries do not 
stay true to these funding commitments. 
Lately, there have been encouraging signs 
towards their realization, with almost 10 
billion USD pledged to the GCF. More-
over, as the most important member of 
the G77, China for the first time com-
mitted to reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions, after reaching a peak before 
2030. This marks an important step as it 
acknowledges how much the world has 
changed since the 1990s, when a fixed set 
of countries was classified as “developing” 
and exempt from binding commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol.
However, the obstacles in the way of a credible 
agreement remain immense. While framework rules for 
the GCF have been specified by its Board, detailed proce-
dures are still to be developed. For its overall success, it is 
essential that the GCF a) attracts enough funding and b) 
that such funding is spent efficiently. Both of these issues 
are closely related. First, if concerns regarding the latter 
cannot be convincingly addressed, the fund might simply 
be unable to attract enough money. Second, even if suffi-
cient resources were available, inefficient spending would 
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damage the GCF’s goals and compromise mitigation and 
adaptation benefits. Both donor and recipient countries 
thus need to ensure that the GCF acquires broad legiti-
macy through procedures that guarantee effectiveness. 
Otherwise, a new accord will be doomed to failure even 
before it is enacted.
Crossroads and Quandaries of Climate Change
In the diplomatic struggle for an accord, India illustrates 
the quandaries of climate change mitigation and adapta-
tion needs perhaps most strongly, with a huge number of 
people exposed to poverty and global-warming-related 
risks, but a significant and rising share of CO2 emissions. 
Our research on energy poverty reduction efforts in India 
illustrates key challenges and offers insights and relevant 
lessons to GCF effectiveness. 
We focus on ‘energy poverty’ and India for two rea-
sons. First, while India portrays itself internationally as an 
‘emerging power’, it is actually still a poor developing 
country. Despite impressive economic growth rates, with 
GDP more than tripling in only two decades, average per 
capita income is less than half of the Chinese one. Overall 
poverty levels remain extremely high, with around 400 
million people, or 25 per cent of the population living on 
less than USD 1.25 per day.1 Basic needs, such as access to 
modern energy sources, remain a persistent challenge.
Second, ‘energy poverty’ is an issue that cuts across 
both climate change mitigation and development assis-
tance. The GCF faces tasks and challenges similar to those 
that are dealt with in development assistance since dec-
ades. Since the early 2000s, specific policies seek to broad-
ly enhance aid effectiveness. The ensuing discussion put 
donor earmarking of funds against the principle of ‘owner-
ship’ and favoured the latter in order to ensure that efforts 
concord with priorities set by developing countries.2 Thus 
far, the GCF favours similar arrangements.
Recently, though, the ownership principle moved 
onto the defensive. Critics pin it against ‘value-for-money’ 
approaches, supposed to consist of a re-
sults-oriented management, specific is-
sue-focus, including private actors – and 
aid strictly tied to donor control.3 We do 
not agree with putting ownership up 
against value-for-money, but rather seek 
to highlight that the latter is as much of 
concern to developing countries as it is to 
donors. As our case study demonstrates, 
the distributive implications of funding 
bear political effects that constantly en-
danger the consistency of normative 
goals and actual results.
The Politics of Energy Poverty
‘Energy poverty’ is a politically used term 
in India.4 Critics suggest that some actors 
might exploit the term for their own pur-
poses. We are interested in the politics of energy poverty 
and argue that there is a struggle between official commit-
ments and domestic politics. We investigate whether ac-
tual policies and results in India are consistent with de-
clared reduction goals. Against assertions to the contrary, 
we find that politicians struggle to deliver on energy pov-
erty reduction. Findings demonstrate that prudent atten-
tion to political incentives, the consideration of stakehold-
ers, and establishing transparency are crucial for a 
successful realization of policy goals.
We examined the extent to which the Indian poor 
can prevail in the political process against better organized 
and equipped interest groups such as the middle class or 
business lobbies with regard to energy policies. We as-
sessed the research issue by empirically analysing, first, 
pricing and subsidy policies and, second, access to clean 
energy. On the first, we find that there indeed is a signifi-
cant distortion of benefits. Vested interests profit dispro-
portionately if not exclusively from most subsidies on en-
ergy sources, making the instrument pointless for efforts 
towards reducing energy poverty. Although their ineffi-
ciency in helping the poor has long been established by 
experts, efforts to significantly change policies are limited. 
They are furthermore met by opposing factions actively 
taking the lead in the name of the poor, even when it is 
clearly not in their interest.
On the latter, access to clean energy, we examined 
electrification and clean cooking policies. Lack of access to, 
and regular supply of, electricity is a large component of 
energy poverty, with most conservative estimates putting 
at least a quarter of the population without access. Yet, 
electrification clearly is a policy area with strong pro-poor 
positions resulting in actual pro-poor policies. Political ac-
tors use such positions to significantly enhance their elec-
toral prospects and stay true to commitments to electrifica-
tion, as long as political costs do not become too high. We 
found several instances where political costs were conse-
quential: First, in times of heightened public scrutiny re-
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sulting in increased costs for political inactivity, such as 
ahead of elections, politicians were keen to appear acting 
on the issue. However, second, political actors did not sup-
port projects initiated by their opponents at different gov-
ernance levels who would then get credit for success. Third, 
when meaningful projects become complex and expensive, 
politicians will rather move their effort to short-term ben-
efits than to endure costs for the larger ambition.
In contrast, ‘clean cooking’ is a policy area with 
much potential, fed by an astonishing degree of neglect: 
With a market potential of 160 million households in In-
dia and serious health hazards leading to more than 
400,000 premature deaths per year, there is much to argue 
for any clean cooking initiative. Yet political actors shy 
away from even committing to any position towards en-
hancing conditions because expected political gains are 
minimal if not negative. Strong cultural habits on cooking 
weigh more heavily than health implica-
tions and demonstrate the former’s influ-
ence on the prospects of any well-intend-
ed technological interventions.
Results
The analysis bears five key insights, high-
lighting that successful energy poverty 
reduction policies are a matter of existing 
incentive-structures, stakeholder-in-
volvement, and established transparency. 
1. Domestic politics are incen-
tives-driven and politicians cannot be ex-
pected to push initiatives that will either 
not pay off or be costly to them – no mat-
ter how noble the aims. This is most evi-
dent from comparing politics on access to 
electricity and on clean cooking. Sup-
porting electricity initiatives had imme-
diate merits while a clean cooking initia-
tive would be costly.
2. In order to ensure that initia-
tives will properly pay off it is crucial to 
mobilize and involve stakeholders. Since 
the allocation of funding brings distribu-
tional implications, it always involves 
politics. Having stakeholders on board 
initially can act as a counterweight to 
vested interests diverting such funds. This 
is an obvious lesson from policies on ac-
cess to electricity.
3. Transparency of the implemen-
tation process and its clear communica-
tion enables stakeholders to pressure for 
success. However, this provides no guar-
antee that initiatives and affiliated com-
plex projects will be carried out. Electrifi-
cation initiatives often stop short of fully 
delivering results. Politicians greatly ex-
aggerate progress and refer to statistical data distorting the 
actual situation and outcomes.
4. Furthermore, sensitivity to context provided by a 
specific issue focus helps in realistically evaluating the ini-
tial conditions that might provide appropriate incentive-
structures and stakeholder involvement. Although also 
true for electrification initiatives, this is most evident in the 
field of clean cooking. Past initiatives failed to take into ac-
count the many idiosyncrasies existing in local cooking 
culture and never successfully mobilized stakeholders. 
Implications
The lessons stemming from examining energy poverty re-
duction efforts in India reinforce the viability of some of 
the principles subsumed under ‘value-for-money’ ap-
proaches, such as emphasizing an inclusion of private ac-
tors and promoting a specific issue focus. In addition, the 
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insights warrant scepticism against procedures that the 
UNFCCC negotiations currently seem to favour for the 
GCF, which are analogous to sector budget funding and 
government ownership – if adequate results-oriented pro-
gramme design and inclusive stakeholder arrangements 
are absent. Ownership is important, but must be ensured 
more broadly than just at government level. While in In-
dia, democratic processes still ensure a certain level of 
stakeholder involvement, the situation must be expected to 
be way more problematic in non-democratic states. 
Nevertheless, this analysis does not lend support to 
simply tying funding to donor control. While governments 
may act against the benefit of the poor in their country, 
donors do not necessarily know better and also have their 
own stakes when discussing the allocation of funds. Our 
analysis suggests that both industrialized nations and de-
veloping countries as partners in the GCF should pay close 
attention to the (domestic) politics of resource allocation 
and establish procedures that go beyond development as-
sistance concepts from the past decade. For donor coun-
tries, there is no point in questioning the ownership prin-
ciple, but there are good reasons for promoting country 
ownership that broadly includes stakeholders. Developing 
countries though need to be aware of the responsibility 
that comes with ownership – and of the formidable chal-
lenges that lie in the way of successfully delivering on goals 
set in climate mitigation efforts. GCF partners need to 
collaborate closely to provide viable funding procedures 
that lend legitimacy to the fund. Otherwise, collecting bil-
lions of USD every year, including from private sources, 
will prove a promise impossible to keep.
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